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Case No. 20080781-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Roger Allen Malcolm, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Malcolm appeals from a conviction for murder, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West Supp. 2008).1 This Court has 
jurisdiction under the pour-over provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(4) and 
78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court err in refusing to give Defendant's two proposed jury 
instructions, where the instructions as a whole permitted Defendant to fully argue 
his defense theories to the jury and where the proposed instructions were 
inconsistent with Defendant's own testimony? 
1
 Unless otherwise stated, all citations to the Code are to the West 2004 
publication. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction is reviewed 
for correctness. Eddy v. Albertson's, Inc., 2001 UT 88, Tf 17, 34 P.3d 781; State v. 
Messer, 2007 UT App 166,1 9,164 P.3d 421. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A.-
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-403 (West 2004) (force in arrest); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-406 (West 2004) (force in defense of property); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(a-c) (West Supp. 2008) (murder). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A jury convicted Roger Malcolm of murder for shooting and killing an 
unarmed security guard during a scuffle at a convenience store. R202. At 
Malcolm's request, the jury was instructed on self defense and three lesser offenses: 
imperfect self-defense manlaughter, extreme emotional distress manslaughter, and 
negligent homicide. R172-81,185-88. The jury was also instructed that a security 
guard "who is not a certified peace officer has only the same rights and privileges 
afforded to any ordinary person/' R138. 
The trial court denied Malcolm's request to give two additional jury 
instructions: (1) an instruction stating that a person may be subject to criminal 
prosecution for unlawful detention and assault if he unlawfully tries to effect a 
citizen's arrest; and (2) an instruction explaining when a person is justified in using 
2 
"reasonable force, other than deadly force, against another" to "prevent or terminate 
criminal interference with real property or personal property." R136-37; R207:389-
99. 
The trial court sentenced Malcolm to a prison term of 15-years-to-life. R220. 
Malcolm timely appeals his conviction based on the denial of his two proposed jury 
instructions. R221. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The day after Christmas 2007, Vern Jenkins showed up at his job as a security 
guard at Sapp Brothers, a large Salt Lake City truck stop that included a 
convenience store, a Burger King, and a larger sit-down restaurant. R205:74-76. 
Roger Malcolm, a regular customer, was already there, being "[l]oud, boisterous, 
[and] annoying." R206:101-02. 
Malcolm was a "little louder and more belligerent" than usual (R206:155) 
Malcolm had arrived at Sapp Brothers on his red bicycle about an hour 
earlier. R206:101. As he did nearly every day, Malcolm had stopped to eat at the 
Burger King on his way to work. R206:78, 93,100; R207:452-53, 479-80. Malcolm 
parked his bicycle inside, near the Burger King seating area, where he could keep an 
eye on it while he ate. R207:453. 
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After eating, Malcolm decided to buy a pack of gum at the convenience store, 
which was separated from the Burger King seating area by a half wall. R206:103-04; 
R207:454,481,483; State's Ex. 25; State's Exs. 7,11,12. The store's cashier counter is 
shaped like an octagon, with an opening on one side and a cash register on each of 
the four corners. R206:84-86,101; See State's Ex. 15, 25 (security video). 
When Malcolm approached the counter, cashier Kaylene Allred was helping a 
line of customers that had formed on the west side of the counter. R206:101,118-19, 
123,130; R207:455. No other cash register was open, although another cashier was 
inside the counter area removing money from the other registers. R206:77-78,101, 
130,138; R207:455-56, 481. 
Malcolm did not join the line of customers being waited on, but placed a pack 
of gum on the opposite or east side of the counter, near the cashier removing cash. 
R206:78,101,130; R207:454-56; State's Ex. 25. Within moments, Malcolm got "really 
loud" and asked, "Do I need to come to the other side?" R206:101, 94-95. He did 
not ask "in a nice way." R206:94-95. After maybe the second time, Allred told him, 
"Yes," and turned to help the next customer in line. R206:101. But Malcolm just 
"kept on and on and on and on." R206:101. "Finally," Allred "turned around and 
said,'I will be with you in just a moment.'" R206:101. See also R206:78. Malcolm 
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still "wouldn't stop it," R206:101. "He kept bellowing, 'Do I need to come to die 
other side?'" R206:101. See also R206:78,138,170-71; R207:453-57,481-82. 
Malcolm was "usually loud or belligerent" to the cashiers, but this time he 
was a "little louder and more belligerent." R206:155; see also R206:79. Customers in 
both the convenience store and Burger King noticed Malcolm's disruptive behavior. 
R206:118-19,130,138-40,153-55,170,228-29. 
Two other customers came and stood behind Malcolm, because it looked like 
a line was forming there. R206118-19,130,137. But the two customers moved to 
the line on the other side of the counter when Malcolm became increasingly 
"agitated" and "loud," and they realized that the register Malcolm stood by was 
closed. R206.118-19,130,138-40. 
The security guard "was always really mellow." (R206:79) 
Just before the other two customers moved; security guard Vern Jenkins 
entered the cashier's counter. State's Ex. 25; see also R206:78, 99-101; R207:481-82. 
Jenkins wore the typical uniform for a Sapp Brothers' security guard: dark shirt, 
pants, badge, and utility belt. R206:248. The utility belt held a flashlight, handcuffs, 
and pepper spray. R206:248. Sapp Brothers security guards never carried weapons. 
R206:248. 
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Jenkins was pulling cash bags from underneath the counter when Allred 
crossed to the other counter to wait on Malcolm. R206:102; State's Ex. 25. Allred 
took the pack of gum and reached for some chewing tobacco that Malcolm had 
pointed to, when Jenkins stopped her. R206:102; R206:78-79; State's Ex. 25. Jenkins 
told her not to wait on Malcolm "until he changes his attitude/' R206:78-79; see also 
R206:102. Jenkins then asked Malcolm to apologize for "the way he was acting." 
R206:102,114. 
Although Jenkins was "stern" and "authoritative," his voice was "pretty 
much mellow." R206:103; 142; see also R206:142. Jenkins "was always really 
mellow." R206:79. "He didn't raise his voice. He tried to be nice about it. He tried 
to handle it like he would every other disruptive person." R206:79,124,142. 
But Malcolm "started getting angry" and rude to Jenkins and "kept going on 
and on and on." R206:103. "It is over just a lousy pack of gum," Malcolm said. 
R206:103; R206:98. Jenkins told Malcolm, "No, you are being rude. You need to 
leave." R206:98; see also R206:96,103,141,146. 
Security guard: "[S]ir, sir, sir... calm down/' R206:182 
Malcolm turned, mumbled something, and walked toward his bicycle in the 
Burger King seating area. R206:103-04,110,142,146-47. Jenkins followed to escort 
him out of the store. R206: 103-04,110-11,124,132,142; State's Ex. 25. Malcolm 
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grabbed his bike and looked as if he was going to leave. R206:103-04,129,132-33, 
148, 210; R207:458. Jenkins reached Malcolm as he was picking up his bicycle. 
State's Ex. 25; R207:458. The two began to "scuffle." R206:80, 90,103-04,110-11; 
State's ex. 25. 
No one saw—and the security video did not show—who started the scuffle. 
R206:91,103-04,120,160, 201, 209, 215; State's Ex. 25. And no one saw the entire 
scuffle. R94,103-04,112,120,124-25,133,143-44,160,171-74,185,203,206, 215-16, 
257. A cashier and customer saw Jenkins grab Malcolm on the shoulder before the 
scuffle began. R206:80,89, 93-94,142,147. The cashier said that when Jenkins put 
his hand on Malcolm's shoulder, Malcolm "kind of shrugged his shoulder like he 
didn't want to leave." R206:80. A couple of witnesses saw or heard the two 
exchange punches. R206:80,90-91,94,173-74,178,186. Some witnesses saw—and 
the security camera showed—Malcolm use his bike to hit and push Jenkins off or 
away from him. R206:143,147-48,159-60. See also State's Ex. 25. 
Many of the witnesses thought it looked like Jenkins was trying to escort 
Malcolm from the store and that Malcolm was resisting. R206:79-80,93,103-04, 111, 
124-25,132,147,158. Some witnesses thought that it looked like Jenkins was just 
trying to control the situation. R206:173-75, 182, 189, 210. During the scuffle, 
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Jenkins kept saying, "[S]ir, sir, sir," "calm down." R206:182. Malcolm kept yelling, 
"Get the f—off me." R206:182,186, 200, 202, 216. 
When it appeared that Jenkins needed help, three customers started toward 
the scuffle to help him. R206:158-59,174,182, 230-31, 239. By now the two men 
were on the ground, with Jenkins on top of Malcolm. R206160,203, 217,231. The 
advancing customers retreated when they heard the gunshot. R206:161-62, 178; 
State's Ex. 25. 
All the witnesses agreed that everything happened "so fast," and that only 
seconds passed from the beginning of the scuffle until the gunshot. R206:145,162, 
174, 208-09,231, 243. 
"All this over af—4ngpack of gum." (R206:220) 
Malcolm fired a single shot through Jenkins's neck. R207:312-315; State's Ex. 
27. Malcolm then pushed Jenkins off him and stood up. R206:160-61,232; R207:464; 
State's Ex. 25. Malcolm placed the gun on a chair, took off his jacket, and sat down, 
"like nothing was wrong." R206:162; see also R97, 108, 113, 175, 204, 219, 234; 
R207:464-66; State's Ex. 25. Malcolm, who had blood all over him, called Jenkins "an 
animal or something," and kept repeating, "All this over a f—ing pack of gum." 
R206:181, 220; see also R206:113,144,162-63,175-76, 203, 291,411. 
8 
A manager, who heard the shot, ran over and saw Jenkins lying on the floor, 
face down, "in a pool of blood." R206:290-91. She tried to turn Jenkins over, but he 
was too heavy. R206:290-91. A truck driver—and former Viet Nam medic—rushed 
over from the sit-down restaurant and began helping Jenkins. R206:262-63, 274. 
The manager asked Malcolm what had happened. R206:291. Malcolm 
replied, "I shot the bastard." R206:291-92. When the manager asked why, Malcolm 
said, "Because he touched me. He tried to stop me, and he had no right to do that." 
R206:292,294. The manager screamed at Malcolm, calling him "a son of bitch" and 
saying, "You just shot my friend." R206:292-93,162-63. Malcolm screamed back, 
calling her "a bitch" and an "idiot and moron." R206:162-63, 292-93. Another 
employee pulled the manager away. R206:255-56, 292-93. 
Other than that encounter, Malcolm was "perfectly calm" and "relaxed" 
after the shooting. R206:267-68, 273, 276, 283, 220. "He wasn't really excited or 
agitated about anything." R206:276. The truck driver trying to help Jenkins asked 
how many times he had been shot, to see if there was another wound. R206:252, 
272. Malcolm replied, "Only once is all it takes." R206:252, 273. The truck driver 
later asked Malcolm why he shot Jenkins. Malcolm replied, "The son of a bitch 
wouldn't quit hitting me." R206:267,272, 276. 
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Malcolm told the police that he had acted in self-defense. R207:415-16, 496. 
After they handcuffed him, he began to verbally abuse the officers and call them 
obscene names. R207:380-81, 385, 407-08, 411-14, 418-20, 423-25,437. As they led 
him out of the store, he kept saying, "Stop hitting me." R206:285-86. No one saw 
the officers hitting Malcolm and Malcolm never claimed later that they had hit him. 
R206:285-86. 
Forensic and physical evidence 
Jenkins died of a combination of suffocation and bleeding to death, from a 
single bullet wound to the neck. R207:309, 320-21. The bullet came from a 9mm 
semi-automatic gun. R207:315,428. Based on the lack of gun residue on the wound, 
the medical examiner opined that the gun was fired at least two feet away from the 
victim. R207:317,327. 
Malcolm's gun was a "special design" with a "special safety" that required 
two actions for firing it: squeezing the safety lever and then pulling the trigger. 
R207:428, 431-32. Malcolm's gun was "probably the safest weapon," requiring 
twelve pounds of pressure to squeeze the safety lever.2 R207:431-32, 434. 
2
 Malcolm's gun, however, could be fired with only one action—squeezing the 
safety—if the trigger was already "pulled in" or "depressed." R207:433. 
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Two days after the shooting, police did a head-to-toe search of Malcolm to 
check for any injuries. R207:429. They documented their search with photographs. 
See State's Exs. 46-54; Defense Exs. 55-58. They waited to document the injuries, per 
common practice, because "bruising shows up more after two days." R207:431. 
They found no bruising, swelling, or redness anywhere on Malcolm. R207:431. 
They did, however, find some "small little abrasions": there were recent abrasions 
on Malcolm's shin, knee, cheek; two little red marks on Malcolm's right and left 
abdomen; and a small injury near Malcolm's left eye. R207:430-35; see also State's 
Exs. 46-54; Defense Exs. 55-58. 
The defense 
Malcolm testified that he had been carrying a loaded gun in a holster 
concealed underneath his pants and untucked shirts, for at least a year. R207:451, 
469-70, 486. Her said he purchased the gun because he lived in an "unsafe 
neighborhood. R407:450-51,469. But although he had legally purchased the gun, he 
had never obtained a concealed weapon's carry permit. R207:470-71. 
Malcolm testified that when asked to leave the store, he immediately walked 
to his bike, had "my hand on my bike seat; had my sandwich, just getting ready, 
positioned to leave," when Jenkins came over and "blocked" him, preventing him 
11 
from"leav[ing] the premises." R207:458-59. The next thing Malcolm knew, Jenkins 
was "grabbing" his neck and head area. R207:459, 484. 
Malcolm testified that Jenkins threw him to the ground, causing his head to 
"smack[]" and "bounc[e]" against the floor. R207:460. Malcolm was "on the 
ground, flat on my back," with Jenkins "smack on top of me." R407:460, 485. 
According to Malcolm, there was no space between the two, from the waist down. 
R207:485-86. Jenkins used his forearms to pin Malcolm's biceps to the ground. 
R407:461-62,485. 
Malcolm claimed that while Jenkins was "pinning" him down, Malcolm 
pulled his gun out. R207:462, 486-87. To do so, Malcolm had to reach under his 
shirt and "hook and jerk" the gun out of his holster. R207:486-87. Jenkins allegedly 
said something acknowledging that he saw the gun. R207:462-63, 489. That was 
when Jenkins started reaching back for what Malcolm alleged was his ''gun belt."3 
R207:462-63. Malcolm thought, "he must not think it's loaded." R207:462-63, 489. 
Malcolm claimed he wanted to fire the gun in the air, "just to let [Jenkins] 
know it was loaded." R207:463. According to Malcolm, there was only "a foot, 
3
 Malcolm acknowledged that he could not say that he ever saw Jenkins with 
a gun. R207:491. All he could say was that he saw what he believed was "a gun 
belt." R207:491. But he could not recall what he saw on the belt to make him 
believe Jenkins had a gun. R207:491-92. 
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maybe a little more" between Malcolm's face and Jenkins's. R207:487. But instead of 
going in the air, the bullet went through Jenkins's neck. R207:463-64. Malcolm 
blamed that fact on a malfunctioning of the safety on his gun. R207:463-64,487-89. 
Malcolm nevertheless acknowledged that he "intentionally meant to fire my 
gun"; he denied only that he intended to fire it at or hit Jenkins. R207:463-64. He 
insisted that the shooting was an "accident." R207:463-64,489,496-97. "I did not, 
absolutely did not intend to shoot... Verne Jenkins." R207:496. It was "a tragedy. 
It was. It's an accident." R207:496. Malcolm reiterated that he only "meant to 
discharge" his gun, but that he did not mean to shoot it at Jenkins: "It was meant to 
let him know that a firearm was armed and loaded, because nothing else made 
sense of what was going on." R207:496-97. 
Malcolm acknowledged that there "was never a need to kill the guard. The 
only need was to control the situation. The firearm - you don't use a firearm to kill. 
. . . [I]f someone is attacking you, not to shoot to kill, to shoot to maim so to speak; to 
control, to stop the attack." R207:498. 
Malcolm also called it a "travesty of the justice system" and "slanderous" that 
all the witnesses had testified that he had made several comments after the killing. 
R207:494,465. Malcolm claimed that after the killing he did not "talk to anybody." 
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R207:494. He denied ever talking to the truck driver who tried to help Jenkins and 
he denied ever admitting that he shot Jenkins. R207:494. 
He explained that his subsequent verbal abuse of the police was because they 
"tortured" him with the handcuffs and "assumed everything as soon as they got 
there." R207:494. "Then here me being put through a t ragedy. . . like that," he said, 
"it was too much for me to be civil." R207:494. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Malcolm argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused 
to give two proposed jury instructions. The first proposed instruction provided that 
a person who uses force to make an invalid citizen's arrest may be criminally 
prosecuted for unlawful detention, assault, or aggravated assault. The second 
proposed instruction provided that a person may use force "to prevent or terminate 
criminal interference with real or personal property," but only if "the person to be 
removed refuses to leave, damages property, or threatens the safety of others." 
Malcolm argues that without these two instructions, the jury was unable to 
fully consider the two lesser offenses of extreme emotional disturbance 
manslaughter and imperfect self-defense manslaughter. Specifically, Malcolm 
contends that the two proposed instructions were necessary for the jury to consider 
the defense theory that Jenkins unjustifiably attacked Malcolm as Malcolm was 
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trying to peaceably leave the store, and that this unprovoked attacked induced 
either an extreme emotional disturbance or a reasonable belief that Malcolm was 
legally justified in using deadly force. 
The trial court did not err in refusing the proposed instructions because 
Malcolm in fact argued that very theory to the jury and the instructions as a whole 
permitted the jury to fully consider it. The trial court instructed the jury on self-
defense, extreme emotional disturbance manslaughter, imperfect self-defense 
manslaughter, negligent homicide, when force may and may not used, and that a 
security guard "has only the same rights and privileges afforded to any ordinary 
person/' 
The trial court also did not err in refusing the proposed instructions because 
they were inconsistent with Malcolm's own testimony. Although Malcolm testified 
that Jenkins unjustifiably attacked him, he insisted that he did not intend to shoot 
Jenkins at all; rather, he claimed that he was only trying to fire a warning shot and 
that the shooting was an accident. That testimony thus rebutted any claim that the 
shooting was the result of an extreme emotional disturbance or a reasonable belief 
that he was legally justified in shooting Jenkins. 
Finally, even assuming error, any error was harmless where Malcolm fully 
argued his manslaughter theories to the jury and where no evidence supported that 
15 
Malcolm acted under either an extreme emotional disturbance or a reasonable belief 
that the shooting was legally justified. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANTS TWO PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS WHERE THE 
INSTRUCTIONS AS A WHOLE PERMITTED DEFENDANT TO 
FULLY ARGUE HIS THEORIES TO THE JURY AND WHERE THE 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS WERE INCONSISTENT WITH 
DEFENDANTS TESTIMONY 
Malcolm argues that his murder conviction should be overturned because the 
trial court refused to give two proposed jury instructions. Br. Aplt. 10-16. The first 
proposed instruction stated that a person who uses reasonable non-deadly force to 
effect a citizen's arrest may be criminally prosecuted for unlawful detention, assault, 
or even aggravated assault, if it turns out that the arrest was illegal. R137; R207:389-
90. The second stated that a person may use reasonable non-deadly force "to 
prevent or terminate criminal interference with real or personal property/' but only 
if "the person to be removed refuses to leave, damages property, or threatens the 
safety of others." R136; R207:397-98. Malcolm argues that the failure to give these 
two instructions prevented the jury from adequately considering the lesser offenses 
of extreme emotional disturbance manslaughter and imperfect self-defense 
manslaughter. Br. Aplt. 19, 22-23, 25, 28. 
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The trial court did not err in refusing to give the two instructions. First, the 
court's instructions as a whole allowed Malcolm to thoroughly argue his theories of 
manslaughter to the jury. Malcolm's proposed instructions would have added 
nothing to the jury's consideration of the two manslaughter instructions that were 
given. Second, the proposed instructions were inconsistent with Defendant's own 
testimony. Finally, any error in not giving the proposed instructions was harmless. 
Malcolm was allowed to and did fully argue his theories, but the evidence, 
including Malcolm's own testimony, did not support either theory of manslaughter. 
A. Proceedings below. 
1. The proposed instructions and the trial court's ruling.4 
The jury was instructed on self-defense. Rl85-93. At Malcolm's request, the 
jury was also instructed on the lesser offenses of extreme emotional disturbance 
manslaughter, R17L-76, imperfect self-defense manslaughter, R1Z7-S0, and negligent 
homicide. K181-83. i He instructions also told the jury when torce was and was not 
justified. R185-187, 190. And the instructions informed the jury that a "security 
guard who is not a certified peace officer has only the same rights and privileges 
4
 A copy of the transcript of Malcolm's argument and the trial court's ruling 
on the proposed instructions is attached in Addendum B. A copy of all the 
instructions given is attached in Addendum C. 
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afforded to any ordinary person/' R195. See Addendum C (Instructions 28-35,40-
42,45,49 A). 
Defense counsel had no objections to the foregoing instructions. R207:399. 
But before the State rested its case, defense counsel asked the trial court to give two 
additional instructions. First, he asked the trial court to instruct the jury that using 
reasonable force in an unlawful citizen's arrest could result in criminal prosecution 
for unlawful detention, assault, or aggravated assault: 
Any person is justified in using reasonable force, except deadly 
force, which he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect an arrest. 
However, the person does so at his own peril inasmuch the arrest must 
be legal. If the arrest is determined to be invalid or is without legal 
justification, the person making the arrest loses this justification and 
may be subject to criminal prosecution for, amongst other charges, 
unlawful detention and assault. Depending on the circumstance, the 
person making the illegal arrest could be charged with aggravated 
assault. 
R207:389-90; R137. 
Second, he asked the trial court to instruct the jury that while a person could, 
under certain circumstances, use force to remove someone from real property, he 
could do so only if the person to be removed refused to leave: 
A person is justified in using reasonable force, other than deadly 
force, against another, when and to the extent that he reasonably 
believes that force is necessary to prevent or terminate criminal 
interference with real property or personal property: 
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1) lawfully in his possession; or 
2) belonging to a person whose property he has a legal duty 
to protect. 
However, a person may only use force to remove a person from 
real property if the person to be removed refuses to leave, damages 
property, or threatens the safety of others. 
R136; R207:397. 
Defense counsel asked for the citizen's arrest instruction because he was 
worried that the jury might believe that Jenkins, as a security guard, had the 
authority to arrest Malcolm and that it was, therefore, legal for Jenkins to be the 
aggressor: 
I'm afraid that the jury is going to believe that Mr. Jenkins was 
arresting Mr. Malcolm. Inasmuch, they're going to believe, if that's the 
case, then it was legal for him to be the aggressor in this altercation. 
And our argument, and I think there's evidence to support it, is that 
the first physical contact between these individuals was Mr. Jenkins 
touching Mr. Malcolm, not the other way around. And I'm afraid that 
the jury, if they believe that he had the authority to arrest someone as a 
security guard, or if they're aware that citizens may make arrests, they 
may believe that it's okay for you to use reasonable force to arrest 
someone. 
R207:390. Defense counsel was also concerned that if the jury thought that Jenkins 
was using reasonable force to effect an arrest, it might believe that Malcolm had "no 
right to defend himself." R207:391. 
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Defense counsel asked for the second instruction because he wanted to argue 
that while a person could use reasonable force to "terminate [another's] criminal 
interference with private property/' he could not "self-help and use force 
immediately. If that person refuses to leave, then you can use force." R207:395. 
"But if that person is complying with that order, they may not then use force to evict 
that person/' R207:396. Again, counsel was worried that because Jenkins was a 
security guard, the jury "may believe that he has some authority that they're not 
instructed on under the law." R207:392. Counsel explained that he wanted both 
instructions to "argue to the jury that Mr. Jenkins had no legal right to place his 
hand on Mr. Malcolm." R207:393. 
The trial court told counsel that he was "free to make that argument." 
R207:393. The trial court believed that "the jury instructions" "as a whole" already 
covered the arguments the defense wanted to make. R207:396-97.~ The trial court 
intended to instruct the jury that Jenkins, although a security guard, was to be 
viewed as any other person: 
And the jury instructions cover those. The only exception is to a peace 
officer, and there's been no evidence there's been a peace officer 
involved in this. So, you exclude a peace officer and you're left with 
anybody else; whether they're a security guard, a store manager, or 
cashier. A cashier can say, "leave the premises." A security guard can 
say, "leave the premises." A manager can say, "leave the premises." 
They're all treated the same. 
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R207:396. 
2. The defense elicits testimony on its legal theory.5 
After the trial court told defense counsel he could present his theory to the 
jury, the defense elicited testimony from a police witness that a security guard, like 
any other "ordinary citizen" could effect a citizen's arrest for a crime committed in 
his presence. R207:439. The defense also elicited that if an ordinary citizen "makes 
an illegal arrest or an improper arrest, they can be subject to criminal prosecution," 
because "if it later proves to be not a legal or justifiable arrest or excusable arrest, or 
a valid arrest, they're subjecting themselves to be an aggressor in a fight." R207:439. 
3. The defense argues its legal theories in closing.6 
The defense argued in closing that Jenkins had no "legal right to attack" 
Malcolm and "no legal justification . . . to escort [Malcolm] with force off the 
property/'__ R208:533. The defense contended that the evidence^showed that when 
asked to leave, Malcolm immediately complied. R208:535-37. The defense claimed 
that for some unknown reason, Jenkins unreasonably decided to use physical force 
to make Malcolm leave. R208:537. After pointing out that Malcolm had not 
threatened anyone or destroyed any property, the defense noted that Jenkins was 
5
 A copy of the transcript of this testimony is attached as Addendum D. 
6
 A copy of the transcript of the defense's closing argument is attached as 
Addendum E. 
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not"a police officer. He doesn't know the law. He's an ordinary citizen. And when 
he uses physical force on someone he does so at his own peril." R208:543. 
The defense then reiterated that it was Jenkins who started the physical 
altercation, which "could have led to death or serious bodily injury." R208:543. The 
defense argued that Jenkins had committed an aggravated assault on Malcolm by 
throwing him "on the concrete floor with such great force" that his head 
"bounce[d]" off of it. R208:539, 543. This altercation, the defense contended, gave 
Malcolm "a reasonable basis to believe that his life was in danger," and thereby 
justified Malcolm's pulling out and firing his gun. R208:538-39, 542-43. 
The defense argued that there were two ways the jury could find 
manslaughter instead of murder. R208:544-45. First, the jury could find Malcolm 
acted under an extreme emotional disturbance as a result of "being physically 
assaulted; thrown to the ground; head bouncing off the concrete tiles." R208:544. 
Second, the jury could find imperfect self-defense manslaughter, because Jenkins 
illegally acted as the aggressor: 
No one has told you that Mr. Jenkins' actions were legal. They weren't. 
He had no legal right whatsoever to use force against [Malcolm]. And 
by so doing, he was the initial aggressor. But if you feel that [Malcolm] 
at no time, because of that, had a right to pull that gun, that's imperfect 
self defense. That's manslaughter also. 
R208:544. 
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The defense finally argued that the jury could find negligent homicide if it 
found that Malcolm's intent was "to shoot the gun in the air as a warning shot," but 
that he accidentally shot Jenkins as a result of the struggle. R208:545. 
B. The trial court properly denied Defendant's proposed instructions, 
where the instructions as a whole permitted him to fully argue his 
defense theory to the jury. 
Malcolm argues that his two proposed instructions were necessary for the 
jury to fully consider the lesser offenses of extreme emotional disturbance 
manslaughter and imperfect self-defense manslaughter. Specifically, he contends 
that absent his two proposed instructions, the jury could not properly consider 
whether Jenkins's "provocation [as the aggressor] would cause a reasonable person 
to suffer overwhelming distress or to believe that he was entitled to defend himself, 
although he may not be entitled to use deadly force." Br. Aplt. 19,22,23, 25. 
1^ A trial court need not give requested instructions if their basic 
concepts are covered in the instructions as a whole. 
Malcolm is correct that a trial court "has a duty to instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the facts of the case." State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 
1992) (citing State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75,78 (Utah 1981)). A defendant "has a right to 
have his or her theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and 
comprehensible manner." Id. (citing State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052,1058 (Utah 1985)). 
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See also State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). "Failure to give requested 
instructions is reversible error if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the 
complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law." 
Jorgensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah App. 1987). But it "'is not error to refuse a 
proposed instruction if the point is properly covered in the other instructions/" 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238 (quoting State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982)). 
See also Ontiveros, 835 P.2d at 205-06. Consequently, jury instructions must be 
viewed "in their entirety." Ontiveros, 835 P.2d at 205. This Court "will affirm when 
the jury instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to 
the case." Id. (citation omitted). Also, a defendant is not entitled to an instruction 
that is inconsistent with his own testimony. See State v. Quada, 918 P.2d 883, 886 
(Utah App. 1996) (defendant not entitled to lesser included offense instruction 
^vhere his testimony negated finding that he could be guilty of lesser offense). 
2. The court's instructions, read as a whole, conveyed the basic 
concepts that Defendant sought to have covered and allowed him 
to fully argue his manslaughter theories to the jury. 
As stated, Malcolm argues on appeal that without his two proposed 
instructions, the jury was unable to fully consider his theory that he was guilty of 
either extreme emotional disturbance manslaughter or imperfect self-defense 
manslaughter. The trial court, however, correctly recognized that the court's 
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instructions, read as a whole, fairly instructed the jury on the law applicable to the 
case and allowed Malcolm to fully argue his theories to the jury. R207:388-99. 
As a threshold matter, Malcolm expressly argued to the jury the very theory 
that he now claims the jury could not fully consider without his two proposed 
instructions. As an alternative to Malcolm's primary theory of self-defense—a 
theory rejected by the jury—Malcolm argued that he was guilty only of 
manslaughter, either because he acted under an extreme emotional disturbance or 
because he reasonably, albeit erroneously, believed that the shooting was legally 
justified. See R208:538-45. In support of his theories, Malcolm argued that Jenkins 
was the aggressor. R208:533-43. He also argued that Jenkins was not legally 
justified in using any kind of force against him because he was voluntarily leaving 
after being asked to do so. R208:533-37. Malcolm argued that Jenkins's unjustified 
act ot aggression either legally justified the shooting (self-defense), caused Malcolm 
to act under an extreme emotional disturbance, or made Malcolm reasonably believe 
that he was legally justified in shooting Jenkins, even though he was not. R208:533-
43. 
Contrary to Malcolm's claims, the instructions as a whole permitted the jury 
to fully consider both theories of manslaughter. First, the jury was directed that if it 
found all the elements of murder, it should then consider whether the murder 
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should be reduced to manslaughter under either of the two manslaughter variants. 
R171-72. 
The jury was correctly instructed that Malcolm was guilty of extreme 
emotional disturbance manslaughter if he unlawfully caused the death of Jenkins 
"[u]nder extreme emotional distress and there was a reasonable explanation for the 
distress/7 R173. "Extreme emotional distress/7 the instructions explained, "does not 
include a condition resulting from mental illness or distress that is substantially 
caused by the defendant's own conduct." R175. Also, the extreme emotional 
distress "must be triggered by something external to the accused, and his reaction to 
such external stimulus must be reasonable." R175. "Such distress, therefore, cannot 
have been brought about by the defendant's own peculiar mental processes, or by 
his own knowing or intentional involvement in a crime." R175. Moreover, the 
"reasonableness of an explanation or excuse for the stress shall be determined from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances." R176. 
See Addendum C (Instructions 29, 31, 32). 
With respect to imperfect self defense manslaughter, the court's instructions 
correctly explained that Malcolm was guilty of that offense if he unlawfully caused 
the death of Jenkins "[ujnder a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a 
legal justification or excuse for his conduct," even though "the conduct was not 
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legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances/' Rl77. And, as in 
assessing the reasonableness of an explanation for an extreme emotional 
disturbance, the reasonableness of a belief in a legal justification was to "be 
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing 
circumstances/' R179. See Addendum C (Instructions 33,35). 
The court's instructions also correctly explained when force was and was not 
justified. A person is "justified in threatening or using force against another when 
and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend 
himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force." 
R185. A person is justified in using deadly force "only if he or she reasonably 
believes that force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself 
or a third person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to 
prevent tne commission ot a forcible felony!r R185. But a person is not justified in 
using force if he (1) "initially provokes the use of force against himself with the 
intent to use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant"; (2) "is 
attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony"; or (3) "was the aggressor." R186. The court's instructions 
correctly explained that to justify "acting in self-defense," the danger did not have to 
be "real" or "impending and immediate," "so long as the defendant acted as a 
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reasonable person in the defendant's position." R190. See Addendum C 
(Instructions 40, 41,45). 
Finally, the jury was correctly instructed that a "security guard who is not a 
certified peace officer has only the same rights and privileges afforded to any 
ordinary person." R195. See Addendum C (Instruction 49A). 
As stated, Malcolm does not challenge any of the foregoing instructions. He 
argues only that without his two proposed instructions, the jury would have been 
unable to fully consider his theory that Jenkins's allegedly unjustifiable and 
unprovoked attack induced either an extreme emotional disturbance or a reasonable 
belief that Malcolm was legally justified in using deadly force. 
But if the jury accepted Malcolm's claim that he was voluntarily leaving the 
store when Jenkins unjustifiably attacked him, the court's instructions clearly 
allowed the jury to fully consider whether that unjustifiable attack provoked an 
"extreme emotional distress" for which "there was a reasonable explanation or 
excuse." See R173-75. First, assuming that the jury believed that Malcolm was 
already peaceably leaving the store and that Jenkins was the aggressor, the court's 
instructions allowed the jury to find that Jenkins was not justified in using force. See 
R187 (a person is not justified in using force if he "was the aggressor"); R185 (a 
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person is justified in using force only when and to extent he believes force necessary 
to defend himself against another's imminent use of unlawful force). 
If the jury made that determination, it could then consider Malcolm's 
argument that Jenkins's unjustifiable attack either induced an extreme emotional 
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse or a reasonable 
belief that Malcolm was legally justified in responding with deadly force. 
An instruction that Jenkins could have been prosecuted for an illegal citizen's 
arrest adds nothing to that determination. Nor does an instruction that force could 
not be used to remove someone from the premises who was already leaving 
voluntarily. See Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238 (court not required to instruct on a point 
already covered by other instructions). 
Moreover, the two proposed instructions would have cut against the 
reasonaoieness or iviaicoim s expiananon or excuse ror an extreme emotional 
disturbance. Suggesting that Jenkins was trying to effect what he thought was a 
legitimate citizen's arrest might have conveyed to the jury that Malcolm's alleged 
extreme emotional disturbance to this show of apparent authority was 
unreasonable. This was precisely what defense counsel below said that he was 
trying to avoid. See R207:390,392. 
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The trial court, therefore, did not err in refusing the two proposed 
instructions. 
C. The trial court properly denied Defendant's two proposed 
instructions where they were inconsistent with his own testimony. 
The trial court's refusal to give the two proposed instructions was also proper 
because, as it turned out, they were inconsistent with the Defendant's own 
testimony.7 See Quada, 918 P.2d at 886 (defendant not entitled to lesser included 
offense instruction where his testimony negated finding that he could be guilty of 
lesser offense). 
Although Malcolm testified that Jenkins unjustifiably attacked him, he was 
adamant that he did not intend to shoot Jenkins at all. Rather, Malcolm claimed that 
the shooting was an "accident" and he meant only to fire a warning shot. R207463-
64, 489, 496-97. Thus, Malcolm's own testimony negated any claim that he shot 
Jenkins under an extreme emotional disturbance or a reasonable belief that he was 
legally justified in shooting Jenkins. Accordingly, he was not entitled to any 
instructions that would have assisted the jury in finding him guilty under either 
theory of manslaughter. See State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 870-72 (Utah 1998) 
7
 The trial court did not refuse the two proposed instructions on this ground 
because it ruled on the request before Malcolm testified. See R407:388-99. 
Nevertheless, this Court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any alternative ground 
appearing on the record. Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, f 18, 29 P.3d 1225. 
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(ordering instruction precluding jury from considering lesser offense of extreme 
emotional disturbance manslaughter was harmless where no evidence supported 
finding that Piansiaksone acted under extreme emotional disturbance). 
D. Alternatively, any error was harmless. 
Even assuming that the two proposed instructions should have been given, 
any error was harmless because Malcolm fully argued his manslaughter theories to 
the jury. Although the trial court did not give the proposed instructions, Malcolm 
was able to elicit, without objection, his legal theory of citizen's arrest through his 
cross-examination of a police officer. See R207:439; Addendum D. The police officer 
set forth every material element of Malcolm's citizen's arrest instruction. Id. 
Malcolm then used that testimony to argue in closing that Jenkins, as an "ordinary 
citizen/' had no rignt to use force to make Malcolm leave the store, where Malcolm 
was already voluntarily doing so. R208:542. 
Moreover, even if the proposed instructions had been given, there is no 
reasonable likelihood of a different outcome where the evidence overwhelmingly 
negated any finding that Malcolm acted under an extreme emotional disturbance or 
that he reasonably believed that he was legally justified. See Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 
870-72 (no harm in ordering instructions that foreclosed consideration of extreme 
emotional disturbance manslaughter where evidence did not support giving that 
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instruction in the first place). With respect to extreme emotional disturbance 
manslaughter, nothing suggested that Malcolm even suffered from an extreme 
emotional disturbance. All the witnesses testified that immediately after the killing, 
Malcolm was "perfectly calm" and "relaxed." R 206:267-68,273,276,283,220. Nor 
was there any evidence that Malcolm had a "reasonable basis or excuse" for an 
extreme emotional disturbance if he had had one. See Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 871. 
Grabbing Malcolm on the shoulder or about the neck, whether to prevent him from 
leaving the store or to assist him in leaving, is not the kind of "provocative act" that 
would cause a reasonable person to lose control to the point of shooting someone. 
Id. See also State v. White, 2009 UT App 81, Tf 23, 206 P.3d 646 (loss of self-control 
from extreme emotional disturbance must "be in reaction to a highly provocative 
triggering event"). Moreover, Malcolm himself testified that he pulled his gun and 
intended to tire it into the air because he wanted to let Jenkins know that the gun 
was loaded. R207:463-64. He never claimed that he fired the gun because he was 
under an extreme emotional disturbance. R207:446-99. 
With respect to imperfect self-defense manslaughter, all the testimony also 
argued against finding that Malcolm reasonably believed he was justified in 
shooting Jenkins. It was undisputed that Jenkins was unarmed. R206:248; State's 
Exs. 26,38. Although Malcolm testified that he believed Jenkins might be reaching 
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for a gun, Malcolm stated that this happened only after Jenkins had seen Malcolm 
brandish his gun. R207:462-63, 489. Thus, even if Jenkins were the aggressor, 
Malcolm was the one who escalated a mere "scuffle" into an altercation involving 
deadly force. Given that it was undisputed that, to this point, Jenkins had neither 
used nor threatened deadly force or force calculated to cause serious bodily injury, 
no evidence supported a finding that Malcolm subjectively, let alone reasonably, 
believed that he was entitled to use deadly force. But again, Malcolm himself 
testified that his shooting Jenkins was an accident, and not the result of a belief that 
he was legally justified in doing so. R207:463-64,489,496-97. And finally, Malcolm 
negated any imperfect self-defense claim when he acknowledged that there "was 
never a need to kill the guard." R207:498. 
In sum, even if the jury had been instructed that an illegal citizen's arrest 
could result in criminal prosecution or that force cannot be used to remove someone 
who is already voluntarily leaving, no reasonable jury would have found that 
Malcolm shot Jenkins under either an extreme emotional disturbance or a 
reasonable belief that he was legally justified in doing so. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted June 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-403. Force in arrest 
Any person is justified in using any force, except deadly force, which 
he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect an arrest or to defend himself 
or another from bodily harm while making an arrest. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-406. Force in defense of property 
A person is justified in using force, other than deadly force, against another 
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that force is necessary to 
prevent or terminate criminal interference with real property or personal property: 
(1) Lawfully in his possession; or 
(2) Lawfully in the possession of a member of his immediate family; or 
(3) Belonging to a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. Murder 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor 
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of 
another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, the actor knowingly engages in conduct which creates a 
grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of another. 
Addendum B 
(Whereupon, the proceedings stood in noon recess; 
after which, at the approximate hour of 1:30 p.m., 
the following proceedings continued in the presence 
and hearing of the defendant but without the presence 
and hearing of the jury:) 
THE COURT: We're back on the record in State versus 
Malcolm. Counsel, have you had a chance to — all parties — 
well, the attorneys are present. The jury is not here. Have 
you had a chance to go through the jury instructions? 
MR. BAUTISTA: We have, your Honor. Your Honor — 
and they seem to be appropriate for what we asked originally, 
and then cover aspects that we asked; except there were three 
additional instructions that the court said that it was not 
inclined to admit, and I would like to have the court 
reconsider that, or have the benefit of the record for that — 
THE COURT: Sure — 
MR. BAUTISTA: — because I do not believe — 
THE COURT: — you1re welcome to it. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, in 
this case, the instruction I had offered — and I will read it 
for the record, please --
A security guard, who is not a certified peace 
officer, has only the same rights and privileges 
afforded to any ordinary person. 
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I believe that's a true and correct statement of the law. It's 
true regardless that he's nothing more than a civilian. 
Peace officers, certified peace officers, hold a 
different standard than normal citizens, especially when 
they're considered in positions of authority. 
I'm afraid that the jury may consider the security 
guard in this case a person of high authority, and they may 
view him in a position where he is trained as a law enforcement 
officer and can tell when, where and how and if necessary what 
force is used to detain someone, or to use physical force to 
arrest someone. 
There was evidence that people are saying that it 
appeared that Mr. Jenkins was trying to detain Mr. Malcolm, and 
I believe what that purpose — and I think the jury needs to 
understand, and it should be an instruction — that he is in no 
position of special trust. He's an ordinary citizen like 
anyone else. 
In regards to the next instruction, 
Any person is justified in using reasonable force, 
except deadly force, which he reasonably believes is 
necessary to effect an arrest. 
However, the person does so at his own peril and the 
arrest must be legal. If the arrest is determined to 
be invalid or without legal justification, the person 
389 
making the arrest loses this justification and may be 
subject to criminal prosecution for, amongst other 
charges, unlawful detention and assault. 
Depending on the cirexamstances, the person making the 
illegal arrest could be charged with aggravated 
assault. 
I think that's a true and correct statement of the law. The 
law allows a citizen to perform a citizen's arrest and use 
reasonable force to effect that. It may not be deadly force 
but they may use reasonable force. 
I'm afraid that the jury is going to believe that 
Mr. Jenkins was arresting Mr. Malcolm. Inasmuch, they're going 
to believe, if that's the case, then it was legal for him to be 
the aggressor in this altercation. 
And our argument, and I think there's evidence to 
support it, is that the first physical contact between these 
individuals was Mr. Jenkins touching Mr. Malcolm, not the other 
way around. 
And I'm afraid that the jury, if they believe that he 
had authority to arrest someone as a security guard, or if 
they're aware that citizens may make arrests, they may believe 
that it's okay for you to use reasonable force to arrest 
someone. 
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Thereby, if he was using reasonable force, initially, 
their argument would be, and if he was effecting an arrest, 
Mr. Malcolm had no right to defend himself. 
And I believe that this is necessary to clarify for 
the jury so that they can understand that. And, more 
importantly, thereTs been no evidence of any crime that Mr. 
Malcolm committed to give rise to any possible legal detention 
or arrest by Mr. Jenkins. 
The video, the evidence has been contradictory by 
some of the witnesses, but the evidence was Mr. Malcolm was 
asked to leave the store, or ordered to leave it. 
THE COURT: Isn't it — doesn't your argument 
preclude the admission of these? I mean, when you say there's 
no evidence of arrest, that's what your argument is: That 
there was an arrest made, and now you're saying there was no 
arrest. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Well, your Honor, there were jurors 
who said that they believed — or, there were witnesses who 
said they believed that Mr. — 
THE COURT: You heard one witness that testified that 
that may have happened. 
MR. BAUTISTA: And again, we need the jury to 
understand there was no legal authority to make that arrest. 
There was no — 
THE COURT: He can either make an arrest or he can't. 
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MR. BAUTISTA: In this situation, him physically 
grabbing Mr. Malcolm, when Mr. Malcolm committed no crime, was 
an assault. 
THE COURT: That may be true, but it doesn't mean 
it? s an arrest. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Well, without a jury instruction — 
well, again, because he's a security guard, they may believe he 
has some authority that they're not instructed on under the 
law. 
THE COURT: There's already evidence in the record 
that he was a security guard and that he was not a peace 
officer. 
MR. BAUTISTA: We don't know if they know the 
difference. We don't know — there are such things as 
certified security guards. For example, we had a prospective 
juror who was a security guard at the airport. She's a federal 
employee. They go through training and she is a 
higher-standard security guard, almost akin to a peace officer; 
but yet she said she's — 
THE COURT: Again, there's no evidence here, that 
I've heard so far, that -- whether he is or isn't. He may be 
POST certified, but he certainly wasn't acting that way. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Well, your Honor --
THE COURT: So you want me to assume something I 
can't. There's no evidence for it. It assumes facts not in 
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evidence. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Well, your Honor, when it's closing 
arguments, I argue to the jury that Mr. Jenkins had no legal 
right to place his hand on Mr. Malcolm, I believe that!s a 
correct statement of the law. But without a jury instruction, 
they are thereby instructed that anything I say is not evidence 
and not the law. 
And that's a correct statement of the law. And I 
believe that, for him to have used force against Mr. Malcolm, 
he had to have justification. 
If he didn't have a justification, then he was 
assaulting Mr. Malcolm. 
THE COURT: You're free to make that argument. 
MR. BAUTISTA: But: again, that argument is muted 
without having an instruction to support it. 
THE COURT: Let's hear from the State. 
MS. COOK: Thank you. I think that this leads us in 
to an extremely confusing area that is in fact not at all 
qualified by law as Mr. Bautista is representing, and leads us 
to all these questions that we are going to try to have the 
jury evaluate when it is completely unnecessary. 
The question in this case is whether these two 
people, who were in a physical confrontation, if it was 
reasonable for Mr. Malcolm to use deadly force because of this 
physical confrontation. 
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And you can lift Verne Jenkins right out of the 
uniform, and just look at them as two men who are scuffling. 
That's the real heart of this case, that physical scuffle, the 
circumstances of that physical contact; did it give rise to the 
use of deadly force? 
And I don?t think we should give instructions to the 
jury that are going to be confusing, that are going to cause 
them to try to evaluate the circumstances that there is not 
clear evidence about. We don' t know that Verne Jenkins was 
trying to arrest. When the witnesses described him as trying 
to detain the defendant? We donft know they're using that in 
the technical term of "detained." 
It could just be that they're just trying to stop 
this person from moving, in that sense of the word "detained," 
not in the police-officer sense of the word "detain." 
It is a very vague and very confusing area. And to 
say that a security guard has no right to lay a hand or 
someone, when that security guard's whole job is to escort 
unruly customers off the premises? 
To say that there wasn't any other crime there, 
that's going to lead me into all kinds of arguments like "was 
Mr. Malcolm engaging in disorderly conduct? Was he in fact 
engaged in criminal trespass?" It just opens up a whole bunch 
of issues that are not really relevant to the heart of this 
case and will confuse the jury and distract us from what the 
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real question is here. 
THE COURT: Any response? 
MR. BAUTISTA: Please, your Honor; thank you. Your 
Honor, there is no crime committed in this situation which 
allowed Mr. Jenkins to use physical force on Mr. Malcolm. 
If he wanted him to leave the store, a person may use 
reasonable force to get someone to terminate their criminal 
interference with private property. That is correct. 
However, you can't self-help and use force 
immediately. If that person refuses to leave, then you can use 
force. If that person is destroying your property, or 
attempting to, you can use force; or if that person is a safety 
risk to others or yourself — 
THE COURT: But, isn't that up for the jury to 
decide? 
MR. BAUTISTA: But they don't know that, because 
we're not instructing them in the law. 
THE COURT: How can they know what happened? Nobody 
can say — I mean, this — Mr. Jenkins may have well said, 
"Mr. Malcolm, you're now trespassing; leave." He may not have 
said it. Because nobody knows. Nobody heard it. And so you 
can argue what you want. 
But the fact is the jury is going to have to 
determine, based on the evidence or lack of evidence, the facts 
in this case and what happened or didn't happen. 
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And maybe they'll have enough evidence; maybe they 
won't. That's the State's burden. 
But the fact of the matter is, as far as the jury 
instructions go, the jury instructions say any person — and 
that's exactly how Mr. Jenkins is to be viewed; is any person. 
And the jury instructions cover those. The only exception is 
to a peace officer, and there's been no evidence there's been a 
peace officer involved in this. 
So, you exclude a peace office and you're left with 
anybody else; whether they're a security quard, a store 
manager, or cashier. 
A cashier can say, "leave the premises." A security 
guard can say, "leave the premises." A manager can say, "leave 
the premises." They're all treated the same. 
MR. BAUTISTA: They may — they have the right to 
refuse service, and they have the right to tell someone to 
leave the property. But if that person is complying with that 
order, they may not then use force to evict that person. 
THE COURT: That's where we come back to what the 
jury is here to find out. 
MR. BAUTISTA: I understand that, your Honor, but 
that's the law, and that's why I'm asking the court to instruct 
the jury. There is no law that says you may use force against 
someone just because, if you order them to leave, and they 
actually are leaving — 
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THE COURT: Well, all of that is up to the jury to 
decide. 
MR. BAUTISTA: I understand that, but without the 
law, without the court instructing them on the law, when I tell 
them what the law is, they're instructed not to believe me. 
And that is the law. 
THE COURT: Well, they — okay. The instructions as 
a whole, the court finds, cover this situation. They cover 
Mr. Jenkins as an ordinary, everyday person, can be treated 
just like anybody else. And what you want to get in raises the 
specter of police officers, and that's not an element in this 
case. So, I'm not going to give it. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, if 
I may read the final instruction that we were discussing right 
now. It had to do with reasonable force to evict someone from 
a property. 
A person is justified in using reasonable force, 
other than deadly force, against another, when and to 
the extent that he reasonably believes that force is 
necessary to prevent or terminate criminal 
interference with real property or personal property 
lawfully in his possession or belonging to a person 
whose property he has a legal duty to protect. 
However, a person may only use force to remove the 
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person from real property if the person to be removed 
refuses to leave, damages property, or threatens the 
safety of others. 
Your Honor, I would ask these be incorporated in the record; if 
I may approach? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, one other thing that just 
arose. When I was discussing about the jury instructions right 
now, the State indicated that they wanted the jury to lift Mr. 
Jenkins from his uniform, look at him as an ordinary citizen, 
and when this — during this confrontation, Mr. Malcolm had the 
right to use deadly force in his defense. 
I think that's almost akin to an ackowledgment by the 
State that this is not a first-degree murder and is, at most, a 
manslaughter. 
If thatfs the case — I know they haven!t rested 
yet — but I would make, at this time, and ask the court to 
reserve decision for later, if it so decides, that this should 
be amended from — or, the count of murder in the first-degree 
should be dismissed. 
THE COURT: Based on what? 
MR. BAUTISTA: The State's just indicated that the 
question for the jury is to determine if Mr. Malcolm's use of 
deadly force while he was defending himself was reasonable. 
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That makes this case a manslaughter case and not a murder case. 
THE COURT: Do you want to — 
MS. COOK: Your Honor, I'm thoroughly baffled by the 
argument. What I was trying to demonstrate to the court is 
that this is not a question of whether Verne Jenkins acted as a 
police officer. 
What we're focusing on is physical conduct that 
occurred, and that's all we're focusing on. It's in no way a 
confession that this is a manslaughter case. I know that 
defense counsel will be asking the jury to consider that, but 
I'm clearly not considering that. We're asking the jury to 
convict Mr. Malcolm of nothing less than murder. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure that's a motion — it's 
certainly not a timely motion -- but at this point, other than 
what we've just discussed on these two jury instructions, and 
otherwise, are they acceptable to both parties? 
MS. COOK: State agrees with them, your Honor. 
MR. BAUTISTA: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Bring the jury in. Well, 
give me five minutes so we get these processed and then we'll 
be right back. 
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Addendum C 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





Judge Paul Maughan 
INSTRUCTION /I 
Juror Duties 
You have two main duties as jurors. 
The first is to decide from the evidence what the facts are. In deciding the facts 
you are not to be influenced by pity or prejudice for or against the defendant. You 
must not be biased against the defendant because he has been charged with these 
offenses, or because he has been brought to trial. These facts are not evidence and 
you are not to speculate from them that the defendant is more likely guilty than not. 
The second duty is to take the law I give you in the instructions, apply it to the 
facts, and decide if the prosecution has proved the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
You are bound by your oath to follow the instructions that I give you, even if 
you personally disagree with them. This includes the instructions I gave you before 
trial, any instructions I may have given you during the trial, and these instructions. 
All the instructions are important, and you should consider them as a whole. The 
order in which the instructions are given does not mean that some instructions are 
more important than others. You are to be governed solely by the evidence and the 
law in these instructions. You are not to be influenced by sentiment, conjecture, 
sympathy, passion, prejudice, or public feeling. You are to consider and weigh the 
evidence conscientiously and dispassionately, and apply the law in reaching a just 
verdict regardless of what the consequences of the verdict may be. 
INSTRUCTION j 7 ^ 
Judicial Neutrality 
As the judge, I am neutral. If I have said or done anything during the trial that 
makes you think I favor one side or the other, that was not my intention. Do not 
interpret anything I have done as indicating that I have any particular view of the 
evidence or the decision you should reach. 
INSTRUCTION ) \ 
Lawyers as Advocates 
The lawyers are advocates and they represent their respective clients. When 
they give their closing arguments, keep in mind that they are advocating their views 
of the case. What they may have said at any time during these proceedings and what 
they say during their closing arguments is not evidence. If the lawyers say anything 
about the evidence that conflicts with what you remember, you are to rely on your 
memory of the evidence. If they say anything about the law that conflicts with these 
instructions, you are to rely on these instructions. 
INSTRUCTION f H 
Evidence 
You must base your decision only on the evidence that you saw and heard here 
in court. 
Evidence includes: 
• what the witnesses said while they were testifying under oath; 
• any exhibits admitted into evidence; and 
• stipulations of the parties regarding evidence. 
Nothing else is evidence. 
In reaching a verdict, consider all the evidence as I have defined it. You may 
also draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence. 
INSTRUCTION K 
Direct/Circumstantial Evidence 
Facts may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. The law does not 
treat one type of evidence as better than the other. 
Direct evidence can prove a fact by itself. It usually comes from a witness who 
perceived firsthand the fact in question. For example, if a witness testified he looked 
outside and saw it was raining, that would be direct evidence that it had rained. 
Circumstantial evidence is indirect evidence. It usually comes from a witness 
who perceived a set of related events, but not the fact in question. However, based 
on that testimony someone could conclude that the fact in question had occurred. For 
example, if a witness testified that she looked outside and saw that the ground was 
wet and people were closing their umbrellas, that would be circumstantial evidence 
that it had rained. 
Before you can find the defendant guilty of any charge, there must be enough 
evidence—direct, circumstantial, or some of each—to convince you of the 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is up to you to decide. 
INSTRUCTION _ / t _ 
Witness Credibility 
In deciding this case you will need to decide how believable each witness was. 
Use your own common sense, good judgment, and experience. Let me suggest a few 
things to think about as you weigh each witness's testimony: 
• How good was the witness's opportunity to see, hear, or otherwise observe 
what the witness testified about? 
• Does the witness have something to gain or lose from this case? 
• Does the witness have any connection to the people involved in this case? 
• Does the witness have any reason to lie or slant the testimony? 
• Was the witness's testimony consistent over time? If not, is there a good 
reason for the inconsistency? If the witness was inconsistent, was it about 
something important or unimportant? 
• How believable was the witness's testimony in light of other evidence 
presented at trial? 
• How believable was the witness's testimony in light of human experience? 
• Was there anything about the way the witness testified that made the 
testimony more or less believable? 
In deciding whether to believe a witness, you may also consider anything else 
you think is important. 
You do not have to believe everything that a witness said. You may believe 
part and disbelieve the rest. On the other hand, if you are convinced that a witness 
lied, you may disbelieve anything the witness said. In other words, you may believe 
all, part, or none of a witness's testimony. You may believe many witnesses against 
one or one witness against many. 
In deciding whether a witness testified truthfully, remember that no one's 
memory is perfect. Anyone can make an honest mistake. Honest people may 
remember the same event differently. Where there is conflicting testimony, it is your 
duty to reconcile the conflict as far as you can, but you are to determine for 
yourselves the truth of the case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. H 
Defendant Testifying 
The defendant testified at trial. Another instmction mentions some things 
for you to think about in weighing testimony. Consider those same things in 
weighing the defendant's testimony. Don't reject the defendant's testimony merely 
because he or she is accused of a crime. 
INSTRUCTION /<? 
Offense Requires Conduct and Mental State 
A person cannot be found guilty of a criminal offense unless that person's 
conduct is prohibited by law, AND at the time the conduct occurred, the defendant 
demonstrated a particular mental state specified by law. 
"Conduct" can mean both an "act" OR the failure to act when the law requires 
a person to act. An "act" is a voluntary movement of the body and it can include 
speech. 
The prosecution must prove that at the time the defendant acted, he did so with 
a particular mental state. For each offense, the law defines what kind of mental state 
the defendant had to have, if any. For some crimes the defendant must have acted 
"intentionally" or "knowingly." For other crimes it is enough that the defendant acted 
"recklessly," with "criminal negligence," or with some other specified mental state. 
INSTRUCTION /*? 
Inferring the Required Mental State 
The law requires that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant acted with a particular mental state. 
Ordinarily, there is no way that a defendant's mental state can be proved 
directly, because no one can tell what another person is thinking. 
A defendant's mental state can be proved indirectly from the surrounding facts 
and circumstances. This includes things like what the defendant said, what the 
defendant did, and any other evidence that shows what was in the defendant's mind. 
INSTRUCTION W 
Motive 
A defendant's "mental state" is not the same as "motive." Motive is why a 
person does something. Motive is not an element of the crimes charged in this case 
and does not need to be proven. 
However, a motive or lack of motive may help you determine if the defendant 
did what he is charged with doing. It may also help you determine what his mental 
state was at the time. 
INSTRUCTION *>f 
Definition of "Intentionally" 




Definition of "Knowingly" 
A person acts "knowingly" or "with knowledge" when the person is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause a particular result. 
"Conduct" means either an act or an omission. 
\ / J 
INSTRUCTION » 
Definition of "Recklessly" 
A person acts "recklessly" when he is aware of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that his conduct will cause a particular result, consciously disregards the risk, and 
acts anyway. 
The nature and extent of the risk must be of such a magnitude that disregarding 
it is a gross deviation from what an ordinary person would do in that situation. 
"Conduct" means either an act or an omission. 
INSTRUCTION t^\ 
Definition of Unlawfully 
"Unlawfully" means without legal justification. 
\\A 
INSTRUCTION NO. %*> 
An act committed or an omission made under an ignorance or mistake of fact 
which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense for that crime. 
\\£K 
INSTRUCTION ^C 
Do Not Consider Punishment 
In making your decision, do not consider what punisliment could result from 
a verdict of guilty. Your duty is to decide whether the defendant is guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Punishment is not relevant to whether the defendant is guilty or not 
guilty. 
._2t INSTRUCTION NO 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of Criminal Homicide, Murder, you must 
find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements: 
1. In Salt Lake County, on or about December 26, 2007, the defendant, Roger Allen 
Malcolm; 
2. a) while acting intentionally or knowingly, or 
b) while acting with the intent to cause serious bodily injury to the person, 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life which, or 
c) while acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, he knowingly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to 
another; and 
3. Unlawfully; 
4. Caused the death of Verne Jenkins. 
If there is a reasonable doubt about any single element, you should find the defendant Not 
Guilty of Criminal Homicide, Murder. 
If, on the other hand, you find all the above elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
should then consider whether the defendant caused the death of Verne Jenkins under circumstances 
which would justify reducing the charge of Murder to Manslaughter. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1/j 
You are instructed that there are two ways in the case before you in which you may find 
the defendant guilty of Manslaughter instead of Murder in Count I. 
Murder may be reduced to Manslaughter if you find that the defendant caused the death 
of Verne Jenkins under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse. 
Additionally, Murder may be reduced to Manslaughter where the defendant caused the 
person's death under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or 
excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the 
existing circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. H 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of Manslaughter based on extreme 
emotional distress, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements: 
1. In Salt Lake County, on or about December 26, 2007, the defendant, Roger Allen 
Malcolm; 
2. a) while acting intentionally or knowingly, or 
b) while acting with the intent to cause serious bodily injury to the person, 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life which, or 
c) while acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, he knowingly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to 
another; and 
3. Unlawfully caused the death of Verne Jenkins, 
4. Under extreme emotional distress and there was a reasonable explanation for the 
distress. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the truth 
of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty of Manslaughter. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
In considering the matter of the affirmative defense of acting under extreme emotional 
distress for which there is a reasonable explanation as covered in the preceding Instruction, you are 
instructed that a defendant does not have to establish such defense by any burden of proof Rather, if 
there is some evidence which tends to show that the defendant acted under extreme emotional 
distress, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act under such 
extreme emotional distress. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ? ( 
Extreme emotional distress does not include a condition resulting from mental illness, or 
distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
The "extreme emotional distress" must be triggered by something external to the accused, 
and his reaction to such external stimulus must be reasonable. The terms used must be given the 
meaning you would give them in common everyday use. Such distress, therefore, cannot have 
been brought about by the defendant's own peculiar mental processes, or by his own blowing or 
intentional involvement in a crime. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse for the stress shall be determined from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances. 
\1lo 
INSTRUCTION NO. V> 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of Manslaughter based on imperfect legal 
justification, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements: 
1. In Salt Lake County, on or about December 26, 2007, the defendant, Roger Allen 
Malcolm; 
2. a) while acting intentionally or knowingly, or 
b) while acting with the intent to cause serious bodily injury to the person, 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life which, or 
c) while acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, he knowingly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to 
another; and 
3. Unlawfully caused the death of Verne Jenkins; 
4. Under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or 
excuse for his conduct; 
5. Although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing 
circumstances. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the truth 
of each and eveiy one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty of Manslaughter. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In considering the matter of the affirmative defense of acting with imperfect legal 
justification, you are instructed that a defendant does not have to establish such defense by any 
burden of proof. Rather, if there is some evidence which tends to show that the defendant acted 
under circumstances where he believed he was entitled to defend himself although under the law he 
was not entitled to use deadly force, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not act under such circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5^ 
The reasonableness of the defendant's belief that the circumstances provided a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person 
under the then existing circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 ^ 
There are several alternative means of arriving at the crime of Manslaughter included in 
the definition of Manslaughter. You are instructed that you must consider whether the 
prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed any of the 
alternative types of Manslaughter on the date in question. The law requires that all jurors 
unanimously agree that the prosecution has proven one particular variation of Manslaughter. If 
all jurors unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a particular 
type of Manslaughter, you must so indicate by putting an X on the verdict form beside the 
variation proven. If you are not unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed one particular type of Manslaughter, you must find Mr. Malcolm not guilty 
of Manslaughter. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3>7 
If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether Roger Allen Malcolm is guilty of the crime 
of Criminal Homicide, Murder as charged in the information, you may consider whether he is 
guilty of the lesser included crime of Negligent Homicide. 
However, before you can convict Roger Allen Malcolm of the crime of Criminal 
Homicide, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. In Salt Lake County, on or about December 26, 2007, the defendant, Roger Allen 
Malcolm; 
2. Acted with criminal negligent; and 
3. Unlawfully; 
4. Caused the death of Verne Jenkins. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced that the 
prosecution has proven each of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find Roger Allen Malcolm guilty of Criminal Negligence. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you 
must find Roger Allen Malcolm not guilty of that offense. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ $ 
You are instructed that in every crime or public offense, there must be a union or joint 
operation of the act and the actor's mental state. A person is only guilty of an offense when his 
conduct is prohibited by law and he acts with the culpable mental state as established by law. 
Before a defendant may be found guilty of a crime, the evidence must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was prohibited from committing the conduct charged in the 
information and that the defendant committed such conduct with the culpable mental state 
required for such offense. 
"Conduct" means an act or omission. 
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
"Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is capable 
of acting. 
The term "unlawful" or "unlawfully" means contrary to law or without legal justification. 
A person engages in conduct "intentionally," or with intent or willfully with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
Acting "intentionally" is more than acting "knowingly", "recklessly" or with "criminal 
negligence." 
A person engages in conduct "knowingly," or "with knowledge," with respect to his 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts "knowingly," or "with knowledge," with 
respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause 
the result 
A person acts "recklessly" with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must 
be **' * " av1 - " : *r\ : • - a :;s a:-: _v ... ^.^a;aics a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed '"v.- ' 
actor's standpoint. 
With "criminal negligence," a person acts with respect to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of or "should have known" of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint, 
INSTRUCTION NO. y? 
You may find Roger Allen Malcolm not guilty of any offense, but you may not find him 
guilty of both Murder and any of the lesser included offenses of Manslaughter or Negligent 
Homicide. Mr. Malcolm can only be guilty of one crime. 
INSTRUCTION NO. L ^ 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent 
that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself or a third person 
against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. However, that person is justified in using 
force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably 
believes that force is necessan to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third 
person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the commission of 
a forcible felony. 
(2) A person does not h;n e n duty to retrnt from die force or thrc.:'j:vej : ".. Jescribed in 
paragraph (1) above if the person is in a place in where he has lawfully entered and remained. 
L ^ , -
INSTRUCTION NO. 4J" 
A person is not justified in using force if he: 
(a) initially provokes the use offeree against himself with the intent to use force as an excuse to 
inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; 
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony; or 
(c) was the aggressor. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the trier of fact may consider, 
but is not limited to, any of the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the danger, 
{b) the immediacy of the danger; 
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodih injury; 
(dithe other's pri'ir\inknt acu or\ioLn1 piopensitics ,UK1 
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship. 
INSTRUCTION NO. H^ 
A "forcible felony" includes, among other things, aggravated assault kidnaping, robbeiy, 
burglary. In addition, any other felony offense which involves the use of force or violence 
against a person so as to create a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury also 
constitutes a forcible felony. 
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
INSTRUCTION NO. _ ^ I7 
An aggravated assault can be committed in two manners. It occurs when a person assai ills 
another with such force that serious bodily injury may result or when a weapon is used to cany out 
the assault. 
i — ' / 2 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
To justify acting in self-defense, it is not necessary that the danger was real, or that the 
danger was impending and immediate, so long as the defendant acted as a reasonable person in 
the defendant's position. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J% 
The right of self-defense exists only as long as the tiireatened danger would appear to 
exist to a reasonable person JII [lie defendant's position. When the danger would no longer 
appear to exist to a reasonable person in the defendant's position, the right to iise self-defense 
ends. 
i n 
INSTRUCTION NO. _± 
You are instructed that in passing on the conduct of the defendant, you should not judge 
him by the light of after-developed events nor hold him to the same cool and correct judgment 
which you are able to form, but you should put yourselves in his place and judge his acts by the 
facts and circumstances by which he was surrounded. 
f 
INSTRUCTION NO. Ig 
You are instructed that conduct which is justified, or is done in self-defense, is a defense 
to prosecution fur any offense based on the c induct. 
If you find that Mr. Malcolm was justified in using force in self-defense for any of the 
above reasons, you should find him not guilty of the charges against him. 
INSTRUCTION NO. tf\ 
You are instructed that the laws of Utah do not require a defendant to establish self-
defense by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence. Once the issue of self-defense is 
raised, whether by the prosecution's witnesses or those of the defense, the prosecution has the 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was not done in self defense. The 
defendant has no particular burden of proof but is entitled to be found not guilty if there is any 
basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to whether he 
acted in self-defense. 
INSTRUCTION N u . . _ ^ M 
A security guard who is not a certified peace officer has only the same rights and 




In the jury room, discuss the evidence and speak your minds with each other. 
Open discussion should help you reach a unanimous agreement on a verdict. Listen 
carefully and respectfully to each other's views and keep an open mind about what 
others have to say. I recommend that you not commit yourselves to a particular 
verdict before discussing all the evidence. 
Try to reach unanimous agreement, but only if you can do so honestly and in 
good conscience. If there is a difference of opinion about the evidence or the verdict, 
do not hesitate to change your mind if you become convinced that your position is 
wrong. On the other hand, do not give up your honestly held views about the 
evidence simply to agree on a verdict, to give in to pressure from other jurors, or to 
just get the case over with. In the end, your vote must be your own. 
In reaching your verdict you may not use methods of chance, such as drawing 
straws or flipping a coin. 
INSTRUCTION 4 \ 
Juror Notes Versus Independent Recollec 
.t . . . v : ; ^ ; . - ; ^ to your memory. They should not 
take precedence o\ er : our own independent recollection of the evidence. Moreover, 
those jurors who have nor taken notes should rely on their own memory of the 
evidence and should not be influenced by the fact that another. ./v: ;;,:s ta^en v ;es, 
since the notes are JW> :w 'he io\? taker's personal • ': w w*vcsuim: :~:- • -• her 
memory r-~-v.- • " ' -r • 
INSTRUCTION NO. h ^ 
When you retire to deliberate, you should appoint one of your number to act as a foreman and 
to preside over your deliberations. Your verdict(s) must be in writing, signed and dated by your 
foreman and when found must be returned by you into court. A written form for each of the possible 
verdicts will be furnished to you. 
Regarding Count I in the Information, the verdict in this case must be EITHER: 
GUILTY OF MURDER, 
or 
NOT GUILTY, as your deliberations may result; 
OR 
GUILTY OF MANSLAUGHTER, because Roger Allen Malcolm acted; 
a) Under extreme emotional distress ; or 
b) On imperfect legal justification . 
OR 
NOT GUILTY, as your deliberations may result; 
OR 
GUILTY OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE 
oi 
NOT GUILTY, as your deliberations may result; 
This being a criminal case, it requires a unanimous concurrence of all jurors to find a verdict. 
When your verdict(s) has/have been found, notify the bailiff that you are ready to report to the 
Court. 
INSTRUCTION < 5 
Procedure After lii'iiclmii: .1 N ndict 
Once your deliberations have concluded and the verdic: forms have :>een 
signed, notify the bailiff that you have reached a verdict without revjifmc: x;r 
verdict. The foreperson shall keep the verdict in his or her posses- :.-•- <•>••''• t 
you otherwise. 
p-TT-:; J-f davol June,-ions. 
Judge Paul Maughin 


















security around him at the time. I don't know which it was 
that made :i-.i npliant. 
Q ons of what you know 
about security guards. Detective, is a security guard a 
5 - * oen S P H yiparp i i iff i co v " 
6 \ A They can be, but it's not required. 
Q ' There .J .  > p,:li<.:i I'fm .,ei ;• u 'his community working 
part-time, second jobs7 as security guards, right? 
..A Yes, 
Q To your knowledge, was Mr. Jenkins a certified peace 
in mi nffj cer? 
A Not :. \y knowledge. 
Q A: " security guard is just an ordinary 
citizen like everyone else, correct? 
A i ! i if . 
y i^ xnci o± r i iir-y ^*e noc c s r u i j . i 6 u p ^ a c e Ox.dicers, 
They 1re not certified peace officers, 
"if i'i i n i HV , a pfc3„Liti o ,*.'£ i Ce,; i C i i t i i i s a peace 0-L-L,xcers 
have certain privileges and rights, correct? 
'"' mi in those laws, there's nothing that gives those 
s a m e r-' -:" t* fi i ' > r<«" i.n i i y <*jiJ.:J r .'n , '..on e e l :> 
I "in a,:1; sure how to put that. 
I I p l p c , c f ' h P y " f i" » r\ I -Mfi | [.jnt-cIC fJ I l I. I l l l i t 
A No. They could have rights, like — as a security 
officer, they're given all the rights from their employer. 
They're given rights and privileges to protect that property. 
And they can -- they have arrest powers, just like every 
citizen does. They have the right to effect an arrest if a 
crime is committed in their presence. 
Q Just like an ordinary citizen does. 
A Yes. 
Q But if an ordinary citizen makes an illegal arrest or 
an improper arrest, they can be subject to criminal 
prosecution, can't they? 
A Yes, they could. 
Q And being in a position where, if they -- if they're 
a civilian, and they decide to arrest someone, they do it at 
their own risk, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Because if it later proves to be not a legal or 
justified or excusable arrest, or a valid arrest, they're 
subjecting themselves to be an aggressor in a fight, correct? 
A Yes. They're not covered under the color of 
authority or anything like that. 
MR. BAUTISTA: If I may have a moment, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Nothing further. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
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Addendum E 
It's not just a question of whether there was force 
from one individual and like force from the other person. You 
have particular situations going on, certain physical conduct, 
no argument about that. The question is: Did those 
circumstances rise to such a dangerous and perilous level for 
Roger Malcolm that he was entitled to shoot Verne Jenkins? And 
the clear answer to that question, ladies and gentlemen, is no. 
And for those reasons, all of the elements of 
criminal homicide murder have been shown. This was an 
intentional act; it caused the death of Verne Jenkins; it was 
unjustified — there was no need for it, there was no reason 
for Verne Jenkins to die that day — and it was done by this 
individual. 
And because of that, and the evidence that you have 
seen, the testimony you have heard, I ask you to return a 
verdict of guilty of murder. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bautista. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Thank you, your Honor. 
CLOSING ARGUMENT/DEFENSE 
This was no scuffle. This wasnft a fight. Is there 
any legal justification, any evidence that said that Verne 
Jenkins had a legal right to attack Roger? No. Therefs no 
legal justification that says that he had the right to escort 
Roger with force off the property; even though there's no 
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evidence that Mr. Jenkins ever said that. There was no 
evidence of that at all. 
What we have here is a lot of assumptions. Ms. 
Allred said she thought thatfs what Mr. Jenkins was going to 
do. She "assumed" that!s what he was going to do. 
Acta non verba. Loosely translated, it means actions 
not words. I had the honor of graduating from a service 
academy. Going through military school and being an officer in 
the Marine Corps taught me one important thing: To judge a 
person by their actions, not their words. 
Roger, he's a jerk sometimes. His words were 
callous. His words were offensive. But verbal abuse never 
justifies physical abuse. 
The video is not a piece of evidence. The video is 
the evidence. Witness after witness contradicted themselves. 
Jodie Neeley said that the physical altercation started at the 
cash register; right here. She said Mr. Jenkins reached over 
and grabbed Roger. 
Detective Hartney, who looked at the videos, 
investigated and everything, labeled the video "first contact 
right here." 
You can see in the video Jodie had her back to this 
individual at this time. You can see in the video Ms. Allred 
had her back to him most of the time. Most of these witnesses 
did. 
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The video is the evidence. You can see this for 
yourself. We played this over and over and over, and I hope 
you paid attention. And you have the privilege of taking it 
back with you and watching it over and over. And at first 
glance, it might not make much sense. But you'll see in the 
video, you'll see Roger trying to get away. How do you see 
that? 
You clearly see Mr. Jenkins have his back to the 
camera, reaching forward like this, from one view. 
On the top view, you see that he goes forward. Why 
is he going forward away out of the view of the camera? 
Because Roger's trying to run away. Witnesses said that. 
Lester Huff. Chad Hinton. Chancellor Hoover. David Robison. 
They all said it looked to them like he was trying to get away. 
David Robison said, when at the cashier, it looked to 
him like Roger was leaving. It looked to people like Roger was 
leaving because Roger, according to this video, was leaving. 
He was asked to leave the store, told to leave the store. 
Thatfs legitimate. A store, a business, has a legal 
right to refuse service. Roger doesn't deny that. He knew he 
was obnoxious. But what were his words? "Is someone going to 
help me or do I need to come over there?" He said it four 
times. They're saying he was loud. 
Ms. Neeley said that he was, "like he always is." 
He's always loud. Is he hard of hearing? I don't know. Or 
535 
it!s just his personality, or just the way he carries himself? 
I don't know. That!s not relevant. 
Was he being disruptive to other clients? You look 
at the video. People are shopping. People are being serviced. 
You don't see people standing there staring at Roger. You 
don't see the store clerks being able to not do their job 
because of him asking, "is someone going to help me or do I 
need to go over there?" 
You heard Ms. Allred say, when she went to go help 
Roger, his demeanor changed. He was told to leave. He at no 
time during this — no one said he was cussing; no one said he 
was being verbally abusive; no one said he was using fighting 
words: "Somebody better help me right now or I'll break this." 
No. He stood there calmly, hands in his pockets, 
drinking his soda from Burger King; you see the pack of gum was 
on the counter. 
The news? The news gets it wrong all the time. They 
reported it as a shoplifting. You heard testimony that Ms. 
Allred had the gum in her hand and Mr. Jenkins came and took it 
from her. So, there's no even way to assume possible that 
Mr. Jenkins thought he had to go apprehend Roger because Roger 
stole something; no evidence to support that. 
That's why Roger's not charged with any crime of 
retail theft or disorderly conduct or criminal trespass or 
anything like that; because there was no evidence that he was 
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doing anything wrong. 
He was asked to leave, and he was leaving. He went 
over and grabbed his bike and he grabbed his bag with his 
sandwich; you can see it in the video. You can see it in the 
photos that we put on from the video. 
Number nine, the first contact; just like Detective 
Hartney said. Roger's leaving the store. For some reason — 
unfortunately, we'll never no — Mr. Jenkins decided that he 
needed to go over and use physical force against Roger. 
It's a tragedy what happened, but this is something 
that didn't have to happen. And it's something that 
Mr. Jenkins didn't have to use physical force against Roger. 
You can clearly see, in Number Nine here, and on the video, a 
hand reaching out, grabbing Roger on the chest, or reaching for 
his neck, I'm not sure; probably the jacket. 
The bike goes up in the next frame. Why would that 
be? Because Roger is getting his bike to leave. Or, could it 
be that all of a sudden he's shocked that a hand's grabbing him 
and he leans back so his bike goes vertically up as he leans 
back? Absolutely. 
What else do you see? You can see Mr. Jenkins charge 
Roger. Roger goes up into the corner. He didn't have to be 
charged; he didn't have to be tackled. 
You see Roger trying to get away. How do we know 
he's trying to get away? Because Mr. Jenkins gets behind him. 
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And how did he get behind him? Because Roger was trying to get 
away and slip out, get out of his coat and leave. You heard 
peopleTs testimony that Roger kept saying, "let me go; get off 
me." 
You also heard people say Mr. Jenkins was trying to 
get Roger in a choke hold. You heard Dr. Leis say that a choke 
hold can cause death or serious bodily injury. If someone was 
trying to put a choke hold on me, I would come to one and one 
only conclusion: They're trying to kill me. 
That's going through his mind. He doesn't know what 
happened. He doesn't know what he did wrong. He was told to 
leave, and he's leaving, and all of sudden he's being attacked. 
It's not a scuffle. This is not fist fight. Why? 
Because in this video, in Frame 15, you can clearly see 
Mr. Jenkins leaning over, pulling Roger back; and in one quick 
move, he goes from here — unfortunately, we can't see it on 
the video -- but you can by now realize what happened. 
One quick move, he picks up Roger and brings him 
around, throws him on the ground. That's Roger on the tiles, 
on his back; his head bouncing off that hard tile. 
Dr. Leis said that an impact like that could cause 
death, head trauma. On the outside it would look normal, but 
on the inside there would be trauma. He also said that that 
could lead to serious bodily injury. 
You have a right to defend yourself and use deadly 
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force if someone is trying to kill you, if you reasonably think 
someone is trying to kill you, or if they are inflicting 
serious bodily injury or are attempting to on you; or if 
they1re committing an aggravated assault on you. 
Throwing someone on the concrete floor with such 
great force their head bounces off of it — and you know how 
his head bounced off of it with such great force? Because his 
hat flew up in the air. Rogerf s hat flew up in the air. 
And how do you know it's Roger's hat? Because when 
he stands up a moment later, he doesn't have his hat on 
anymore. 
You see the two frames; his hat flying in the air, 
over, over the wall, and lands. Roger had a reasonable basis 
to believe that his life was in danger. He had no reason to be 
attacked. He had no idea why he was being attacked. 
You heard him. He pulled out his gun when he was on 
the floor. He didn't pull out his gun before. He didn't pull 
out his gun when he was grabbed by Mr. Jenkins. He didn't 
bring out his gun when he was trying to get away. 
He pulled out his gun once he realized, M0h, my God, 
this guy's trying to kill me. He's trying to choke me. He 
tackled me, he picks me up and body-slams me on the floor; my 
head just bounced off of it." 
You remember that Dr. Leis testified that such a head 
trauma could leave someone to be dazed and confused; also very 
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angry. 
This would all contribute to Roger' s behavior after 
the fact. This would all contribute to what was going throucfh 
Roger's mind. 
"I wanted to pull out my gun and do a warning shot,, 
I told him, "I have a gun, get off me." All those witnesses 
said they heard him say, "get off me." Dr. Leis said the 
gunshot was from two to three feet away. That's supported by 
Roger? s statement. 
Roger said he was on the ground, and he had his gun 
up, down by his waist, and he wanted to shoot it in the air. 
If he wanted to shoot and kill, or seriously wound Mr. Jenkins, 
would he have shot like that and somehow unfortunately hit him 
in the neck? Or, would he roll the gun over into the person's 
ribs, put the gun up to the skin of the person and pull the 
trigger then? Because you're not going to miss. 
Unfortunately, he shot in his panic, and 
unfortunately that bullet hit Mr. Jenkins in the neck. Clearly 
it wasn't an aimed shot. 
You don' t try to kill someone, you don' t try to wound 
someone by shooting them in the neck, because you're probably 
going to miss that target. 
Experts trained in marksmanship rarely hit necks. 
Police officers are trained, "two bullets in the chest.11 This 
is where you want to aim at. This was an unfortunate accident 
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that happened because Roger was trying to defend himself. 
They want you to judge him for his words that 
happened afterwards. He got up, he sat down at the table. 
People said he looked dazed and confused; looked like he was in 
shock. 
People said he was mumbling. David Robison said he 
sat there silent, like he didnft say anything. Roger messed up 
yesterday and said he didn't say anything. 
But if you notice something, when he was asked, "do 
you remember telling the police officers that you acted in 
self-defense?" He said, "no, I didn't say that." 
The words that hurt him, make him look really 
calloused, he says he didn't say. The words that help him, he 
says he didn't say. 
He doesn't remember what he said at all. Why? 
Because he was dazed and confused, and angry; because his head 
bounced off that floor and caused trauma. 
They went and examined him for physical injuries on 
the outside of his body and they found abrasions and all that; 
nothing that looked serious. But Dr. Leis said that nothing to 
your head would look serious. There's no medical doctor who 
examined Roger at any time. 
Could he have been suffering from head trauma? Yes. 
Could that have contributed to his behavior afterwards? Yes. 
But what he did afterwards is irrelevant. He was a jerk to the 
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officmxBi he was rude and callous to the friends of 
Mr. Jenkins. Thatf s a shame. 
Judge a person by his actions, not his words. His 
actions were he was told to leave, he was leaving. He was 
complying with the lawful order. For unknown reasons, he was 
then attacked. 
A scuffle isnTt trying to get someone in a choke 
hold. A fist fight isnft body slamming someone on to the floor 
and tiles and up against the wall. 
This is a case of self-defense. We told you in the 
opening that we would have videos for you to look at. 
Mr. Renteria told you, during the opening, that there 
would be evidence that Mr. Jenkins said, "I'll escort him out; 
that he was trespassing him from the store; and that Roger was 
on top of Mr. Jenkins." We didn't hear any of that evidence. 
Why? It doesn't exist. 
You heard the evidence, and the evidence was 
presented to you. None of the stuff that's been reported in 
the news; it's what you heard the last two days. 
Mr. Jenkins never told anyone, "I'm going to escort 
him out." And even if that's what he was — his character for 
peacefulness, his public relations, that he would resolve 
things — if you're going to resolve things, wouldn't you walk 
up to someone and say, "sir, you are leaving?," or, "you're 
leaving, right?" And stand there and watch them leave? 
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Don't reach out and grab them, and then start 
assaulting them. When they're trying to get away from you, let 
them get away. Roger wasn't threatening anyone. He wasn't 
destroying any property. 
Mr. Jenkins is not a police officer. He doesn't know 
the law. He's an ordinary citizen. And when he uses physical 
force on someone, he does so at his own peril. And that's what 
the most tragic thing about this is, that he thought he was 
doing a good job. He thought he was doing what he could. 
I don't know; I'm assuming that as well. But 
unfortunately, he started a physical altercation, and that 
physical altercation could have led to death or serious bodily 
injury. He was doing that. Roger thought he had to defend 
himself. He only had a few seconds to think. 
You have a decision to make. You have to look at all 
the evidence. Look at the video over and over and over; 
please. I ask of you, please; both the corrected and 
uncorrected one. 
You have to decide, under the circumstances of this 
case: Was it Roger's intent to go in there? Was it his intent 
to murder Mr. Jenkins? One gunshot. This wasn't a situation 
where he got up and unloaded the magazine of his pistol. This 
wasn't a matter where he was kicking the body afterwards. He 
got up there and stared at it, dazed and confused and shocked 
at what had just taken place. And what did he do? He sat down 
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and he waited for the police to arrive. 
You have to decide: were Roger's actions reasonable? 
If you believe that hefs guilty of murder, if you believe 
that's what his intent was, I ask you to look at the 
manslaughter instructions, and look at them, and you can find 
him guilty of manslaughter instead of murder on two bases. 
One, that he was suffering from extreme emotional 
distress. The law allows a person a justification -- it's not 
a perfect one; it doesn't say you're not guilty — but it says, 
"under these circumstances, we understand what was going 
through your mind." Being physically assaulted; thrown to the 
ground; head bouncing off the concrete tiles; that's extreme 
emotional distress. Being attacked for no reason? That's 
extreme emotional distress. 
If you believe Roger wanted to murder Mr. Jenkins, I 
ask you to find him guilty of manslaughter, because he was 
suffering from extreme emotional distress. 
I would also ask you to look at the 
manslaughter instructions of imperfect self defense. 
No one has told that you Mr. Jenkins' actions were 
legal. They weren't. He had no legal right whatsoever to use 
force against Roger. And by so doing, he was the initial 
aggressor. But if you feel that Roger at no time, because of 
that, had a right to pull that gun, that's imperfect self 
defense. That's manslaughter also. 
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We can judge him by our cool, calm, collective 
reasonings, hearing the evidence in the courtroom. But the 
Judge told you you're actually supposed to do it — youTre 
actually not supposed to do that; you1re supposed to go back 
there, put yourself in his shoes, as a reasonable person, under 
the facts and circumstances that were occurring at that time. 
Roger said that his intent was to shoot the gun in 
the air as a warning shot. He pulled out the gun, said, "I 
have a gun," and he said that Mr. Jenkins mumbled something; 
and he thought he was reaching back for his gun. He thought 
Mr. Jenkins was armed. Other witnesses did as well. 
The fact that Mr. Jenkins wasn't armed is a mistake 
of fact. He had a gun belt. Many people would believe that 
guards carry guns; so did Roger. 
If his intent was to shoot in to the air, and somehow 
during the scuffle his arm moved at the wrong angle, and 
Mr. Jenkins got shot, that was a negligent act. That was a 
negligent act. And Roger is guilty of negligent homicide. 
I implore you to take the time back there to look at 
all the photos we have introduced, look at all the videos, 
refresh your memory of what people said. Chad Hinton, David 
Robison, Lester Huff, Chancellor Hoover, all said Roger was 
trying to get away. He was trying to retreat. I would ask you 
to find him not guilty, or to use your best judgment as you 
deem appropriate. 
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Guilty men run. Men who thought they did the right 
thing under the circumstances, or thought it was justifiable, 
stay and wait for the police. 
Roger disarmed himself. You clearly see it. He put 
the gun on the chair and he walked away from it. He thought he 
was justified because of the circumstances. And I would ask 
you to find him not guilty. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Ms. Cook. 
MS. COOK: This is not a case of Monday-morning 
quarterbacking of what Verne Jenkins did that day. 
Verne Jenkins came to the counter, he saw a situation 
where it looked like the cashiers were being subjected to 
someone who was being belligerent; other witnesses used the 
word heckling the cashiers. 
He decided, "we're not going to put up with that 
today. You know what? You're going to apologize or you're 
going to leave." 
Other witnesses testified that what Verne said to him 
was, "you either calm down or leave; either be quiet or you 
leave," and then told the defendant to leave. 
And other witnesses testified that, as Verne Jenkins 
leaves the counter area, it looks like, to them, he's going to 
escort this individual off the premises. 
And then, yes, it's clear Verne Jenkins did put a 
hand on the defendant. We know that from a variety of 
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